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Abstract 
This study explores the determinants and characteristics of the out-of-pocket to capacity to pay 
and catastrophic health expenditures in Turkey using a detailed micro-level survey, the 
Household Budget Survey during the period 2002-2011. The results show that those who have 
public health insurance are less likely to face out-of-pocket to capacity to pay and catastrophic 
health expenditures, than those with private or without health insurance. In addition, the study 
explores the expansion of the health reform of 2003, where in 2008 the Green Card (Yeşil Kart) 
holders are entitled, without fee, to the same services as those with public health insurance such 
as Emekli Sandığı, BAĞ-KUR, SSK. The analysis employs a differences-in-differences 
approach using a pseudo-panel based on propensity score matching. The results support that 
the difference of pocket health expenditures between the public health insurers and green card 
holders has been reduced. Furthermore, those who are located in rural areas are compared with 
those residing in urban areas, as the health reform in 2008 included expansion and improvement 
on the emergency services and infrastructure in rural areas. 
JEL Classification: H5, I1 
Keywords: Catastrophic Health Expenditures; Differences-in-Differences; Health Insurance 
Schemes; Health Reforms; Out-of-Pocket Expenditures; Propensity Score Matching; Pseudo-
Panel; Turkey 
 
 
 
 
ﺺﺨﻠﻣ  
  
 ﺺﺋﺎѧѧѧﺼﺧو تادﺪѧѧѧﺤﻣ ﺔѧѧѧﺳارﺪﻟا هﺬѧѧѧھ ﻒѧѧѧﺸﻜﺘﺴﺗا ﻰѧѧѧﻠﻋ ﻊﻓﺪѧѧѧﻟا ةرﺪѧѧѧﻗ ﻰѧѧѧﻠﻋ ﺢѧѧѧﺴﻣ ماﺪﺨﺘѧѧѧﺳﺎﺑ ﺎѧѧѧﯿﻛﺮﺗ ﻲѧѧѧﻓ ﺔѧѧѧﯿﺛرﺎﻜﻟا ﺔﯿﺤѧѧѧﺼﻟا تﺎѧѧѧﻘﻔﻨﻟ
 ةﺮѧѧѧѧﺘﻔﻟا لﻼѧѧѧѧﺧ ةﺮѧѧѧѧﺳﻷا ﺔѧѧѧѧﯿﻧاﺰﯿﻣ ﺢѧѧѧѧﺴﻣو ،ﻼﯿѧѧѧѧﺼﻔﺗ ﻲѧѧѧѧﺋﺰﺠﻟا ىﻮﺘѧѧѧѧﺴﻤﻟا2002-2011ﻦﯾﺬѧѧѧѧﻟا ﻚѧѧѧѧﺌﻟوأ نأ ﺞﺋﺎѧѧѧѧﺘﻨﻟا تﺮѧѧѧѧﮭظأو .  ﻢﮭﯾﺪѧѧѧѧﻟ
 ﺔѧѧﮭﺟاﻮﻤﻟ ﺔѧѧﺿﺮﻋ ﻞѧѧﻗأ ﻢѧѧھ مﺎѧѧﻋ ﻲﺤѧѧﺻ ﻦﯿﻣﺄѧѧﺗصﺎѧѧﺨﻟا ﻊﻓﺪѧѧﻟا  ﻰѧѧﻠﻋ ﻲﺤѧѧﺼﻟا ﻦﯿﻣﺄѧѧﺘﻟا ﻊѧѧﻣ ﻲѧѧﺘﻟا ﻚѧѧﻠﺗ ﻦѧѧﻣ ،ﺔѧѧﯿﺛرﺎﻜﻟا ﺔﯿﺤѧѧﺼﻟا تﺎѧѧﻘﻔﻨﻟا
 مﺎѧѧѧﻋ ﻦѧѧѧﻣ ﺔﺤѧѧѧﺼﻟا عﺎѧѧѧﻄﻗ حﻼѧѧѧﺻإ ﻲѧѧѧﻓ ﻊѧѧѧﺳﻮﺘﻟا نأ ﺔѧѧѧﺳارﺪﻟا ﺖﺤѧѧѧﺿوأ ،ﻚѧѧѧﻟذ ﻰѧѧѧﻟإ ﺔﻓﺎѧѧѧﺿﻹﺎﺑو .نوﺪѧѧѧﺑ وأ صﺎѧѧѧﺨﻟا2003 ﻲѧѧѧﻓ ﺚѧѧѧﯿﺣ ،
 مﺎѧѧѧﻋ2008 ﺎﺤѧѧѧﺻﻸﻟ ﻖѧѧѧﺤﯾ (ترﺎѧѧѧﻛ ﻞﯿѧѧѧﺴﯾ) ءاﺮѧѧѧﻀﺨﻟا ﺔѧѧѧﻗﺎﻄﺒﻟا ﻲﺤѧѧѧﺼﻟا ﻦﯿﻣﺄѧѧѧﺘﻟا ﻊѧѧѧﻣ ﻚѧѧѧﻠﺗ ﻞѧѧѧﺜﻣ تﺎﻣﺪѧѧѧﺨﻟا ﺲѧѧѧﻔﻧ ،لﺎѧѧѧﻤﻟا نوﺪѧѧѧﺑو ،ب
 ماﺪﺨﺘѧѧﺳﺎﺑ تﺎѧѧﻓﻼﺨﻟا ﻲѧѧﻓ تﺎѧѧﻓﻼﺘﺧﻻا ﺎѧѧﺠﮭﻧ مﺪﺨﺘѧѧﺴﯾ ﻞѧѧﯿﻠﺤﺘﻟا .مﺎѧѧﻌﻟاﺢѧѧﺴﻣ  نأ ﻰѧѧﻟإ ﺞﺋﺎѧѧﺘﻨﻟا ﻢﻋﺪѧѧﺗ .ﻞѧѧﯿﻤﻟا ﺔѧѧﺟرد ﺔѧѧﻘﺑﺎﻄﻣ سﺎѧѧﺳأ ﻰѧѧﻠﻋ
و .ﺾѧѧѧﻔﺨﻧا ﺪѧѧѧﻗ ءاﺮѧѧѧﻀﺨﻟا ﺔѧѧѧﻗﺎﻄﺒﻟا بﺎﺤѧѧѧﺻأو ﺔѧѧѧﻣﺎﻌﻟا ﻲﺤѧѧѧﺼﻟا ﻦﯿﻣﺄѧѧѧﺘﻟا تﺎﻛﺮѧѧѧﺷ ﻦﯿѧѧѧﺑ ﺔﯿﺤѧѧѧﺼﻟا تﺎѧѧѧﻘﻔﻨﻟا ﻲѧѧѧﻓ فﻼﺘѧѧѧﺧﻻا ﻰѧѧѧﻠﻋ ةوﻼѧѧѧﻋ
 ﻦﯾﺬѧѧѧﻟا ﻚѧѧѧﺌﻟوأ ﺔѧѧѧﻧرﺎﻘﻣ ﻢﺘѧѧѧﯾ ،ﻚѧѧѧﻟذنﻮѧѧѧﺸﯿﻌﯾ  ﻦﻤѧѧѧﻀﺗ ﺎѧѧѧﻤﻛ ،ﺔﯾﺮѧѧѧﻀﺤﻟا ﻖطﺎѧѧѧﻨﻤﻟا ﻲѧѧѧﻓ نﻮѧѧѧﻤﯿﻘﯾ ﻦﯾﺬѧѧѧﻟا ﻚѧѧѧﺌﻟوأ ﻊѧѧѧﻣ ﺔѧѧѧﯿﻔﯾﺮﻟا ﻖطﺎѧѧѧﻨﻤﻟا ﻲѧѧѧﻓ
 مﺎﻋ ﻲﻓ ﻲﺤﺼﻟا مﺎﻈﻨﻟا حﻼﺻإ2008 .ﺔﯿﻔﯾﺮﻟا ﻖطﺎﻨﻤﻟا ﻲﻓ ﺔﯿﺘﺤﺘﻟا ﺔﯿﻨﺒﻟاو ئراﻮﻄﻟا تﺎﻣﺪﺧ ﻲﻓ ﻦﯿﺴﺤﺗو ﻊﯿﺳﻮﺗ 
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1. Introduction 
Healthcare in many developing countries, including those in Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region, is mainly funded and financed through out-of-pocket expenditures (OOPEs) 
by households. OOPEs is a part of the private health expenditures which include in-kind 
payments and perks to suppliers of pharmaceutical products, therapeutic appliances and other 
health related goods and services and to health practitioners with purpose the enhancement of 
the individuals’ health status. An important tool and policy for a country’s health care system 
is to provide financial protection from extreme OOPEs in order to ensure equitable access to 
health care. In the absence of this policy, a household may be force to spend huge amount on 
medical bills and treatment, as well as, significant use of time, to treat a family member. The 
reason that OOPEs are a concern for policy makers and society is that they have multiple 
consequences to the household, the ill members and to the society generally.       
Firstly, the impact of OOPEs is the catastrophic health expenditure, where according to World 
Health Organization (WHO) is defined as the percentage of income which is spent for health 
expenses and it is set up at 40 per cent.  In addition, the impact of OOPEs goes beyond the 
catastrophic health expenditures, where people do not use health services anymore, because 
they cannot afford the direct costs, such as costs for medicines and consultation and the indirect 
costs, such as transportation. Moreover, this has further impact on poverty and thus overall a 
negative impact on country’s growth and development.  
Therefore, a concern of the policy makers is to protect people of financial catastrophic health 
expenditures as a result of the health services usage. Even though WHO has set up the threshold 
of 40 per cent where health expenditures can be viewed as catastrophic, this threshold can be 
varied in each country depending on the situations and on the national health policies that they 
wish to apply. In our analysis, therefore, alternative thresholds are explored: 10%, 20% and 
30% for robustness checks and sensitivity analysis.  
Overall, this is the first study which employs and examines various topics on OOPEs over the 
capacity to pay and catastrophic health expenditures in Turkey, including the reforms of 2008 
for Green Card (Yeşil Kart)1 holders. The study examines also the relationship between OOPEs 
and catastrophic health expenditures with the health insurance coverage, access to health care 
and possible barriers as distance to health centers in Turkey. In addition, the analysis accounts 
for socio-economic characteristics of the individual and household, such as education, wealth, 
marital status and location of the household such as urban and rural areas.  
In 2008, OOPEs were 17.4 per cent of the total expenditure on health care in Turkey (Turkish 
Statistical Institute, 2011). However, as a candidate country to European Union, the rate was 
higher than the other EU countries, including Germany with 13 per cent, France with 7.6 per 
cent and United Kingdom with 11.2 per cent at the same year (OECD, 2010). Nevertheless, the 
health care system in Turkey has been restructured and has undergone health reforms since 
2003, promoting the use of technology, delivering a high quality of health care, which might 
have affected the OOPEs as well.  Apparently, the ratio was 22 per cent in 2006 and was 
reduced at 15.4 per cent in 2012, while the respective percentage in 2012 was 12.9 per cent, 9 
per cent and 7.5 per cent for Germany, United Kingdom and France respectively (OECD, 
2014). To summarize, in this study; 
 Determinants of OOPEs and catastrophic health expenditures in Turkey, including socio-
economic characteristics, barriers to health care access, health insurance coverage and type 
(social versus private) among others will be analysed. 
                                                          
1 Green Card is an insurance plan for the poor who were unable to pay for healthcare which is provided by government without 
and fee or contribution. 
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 The impact of the Turkish Health Reform regarding Green Card in 2008, on the OOPEs 
and catastrophic health expenditures will be examined. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: In section 2, a brief literature review of previous studies 
exploring OOPEs and catastrophic health expenditures is discussed. Section 3 presents the 
methodology followed, while in section 4 the data are described. In section 5, the empirical 
results are reported, while section 6 discusses the concluding remarks.  
2. Literature Review 
This section discusses previous researches related to this study. Regarding the OOPEs, 
medicines are the main sources of this spending (Van Doorslaer et al., 2007; Mugisha et al., 
2007; Barros and Bertoldi, 2008; Garg and Karan, 2009) and represents between 25-65 per cent 
of the total OOPEs in low-middle income countries (Wagner et al., 2007). Evidence from the 
literature shows that in Brazil and India, households spend 41 per cent and 65 per cent of their 
household income on medicines respectively (Barros and Bertoldi, 2008; Garg and Karan, 
2009), while the share of OOPEs on medicines in Burkina Faso and to Vietnam ranges between 
80-88 per cent (Mugisha et al, 2007; Wagstaff, 2007).  Moreover, the largest inequities were 
reported for income groups, where the poorest spend proportionally more on medicines than 
the richest households do (Wagner et al., 2007). Knaul et al. (2006) found that medicines are 
the most important component of the health expenditures regarding the low-income households 
accounting to almost 50 per cent of catastrophic health expenditure in the first quintile (the 
poorest households), while they amount less than 20 per cent for the richest households’ 
quintile. Concluding, health systems that require lower OOPEs for health care offer better 
protection to the poor against catastrophic health spending.  
Regarding Turkey, Brown et al. (2012) examined the determinants of OOPEs using a Probit 
binary model during the period 2002-2008.  One of the most important findings of their 
research is that insurance coverage may protect households from the risk occurrence of 
catastrophic health expenditures. However, they did not analyze the determinants of OOPEs 
and catastrophic health expenditures for people who are insured under different insurance 
schemes such as private, public or green card holders. Within this study, we do not only expand 
their analysis using the years 2002-2011, but we also take into consideration of different 
insurance schemes where the amount of out-pocket expenditures of people might be different 
according to insurance type that they are covered. As green card holders officially did not have 
the same benefits as enrollees in other public health insurance schemes (SSK, Emekli Sandığı, 
BAĞ-KUR) before 20082, it is more probably that they might spend more on OOPEs and more 
likely to face catastrophic expenditures. In addition to their approach to solve the selection 
bias3 problem, where they follow Sartori (2003), our study employs the propensity score 
matching to account for selection bias as an alternative and more likely better approach for 
causal concerns. 
Moreover we additionally analyzed the impact of 2008 health reform, which entitled the Green 
Card holders with the same benefits of other public insurance beneficiaries, on OOPEs and 
catastrophic health expenditures in Turkey. Using Household Budget Survey in 2003-2006, 
Erus and Aktakke (2012) examined the impact of the Turkish health reforms in 2003 on OOPE 
resulting that their levels have been decreased and the impact varies on income level. Aran and 
Hentschel (2012) examined the impact of the Green Card non-contributory health insurance 
                                                          
2 Prior to 2006, there were three public social security institutions in Turkey SSK (covering private sector employees), Emekli 
Sandığı (covering government employees) and Bağkur (for the self-employed). In 2006, the government merged the formal 
social security system under the umbrella of SGK (Social Security Institution). The members of the Green Card scheme have 
officially obtained the same benefits as beneficiaries in other health insurance schemes only in 2008 (Erus and Aktakke, 2012; 
OECD, 2008) 
3 Selection bias problem may occur if poor households prefer do not use or do not seek health care because of affordability 
concerns. 
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program, which was expanded rapidly between 2003 and 2008 when the number of Green Card 
beneficiaries increased nearly four-fold, on the protection of healthcare utilization of Turkish 
people, defined by whether individuals reduced the preventive and curative care or not. The 
authors found significant effects where Green Card holders reduced both forms of care. 
However, our study contributes to those studies by examining the effects of the 2008 health 
reform for Green Card holders, where they are entitled with the same benefits of other public 
insurance holders, on OOPEs by applying Differences-in-Differences (DID) analysis 
considering the periods before and after the 2008 health reform, as well as, the macroeconomics 
shocks of the economic crisis of 2008.     
3. Conceptual Framework and Research Methodology  
3.1 Research questions  
As it has been discussed in the previous sections, OOPEs can cause huge financial burden to 
households that may drive them in poverty. The aim of this project is to examine various topics. 
Firstly, it explores the determinants of OOPEs and catastrophic health expenditures. Secondly, 
it investigates whether the health reforms took place in 2008 are efficient on reducing the level 
and share of medicines and OOPEs overall.  
3.2 Methodology and data 
3.2.1 OOPEs and catastrophic health expenditures 
The calculation of the OOPEs and catastrophic health expenditures involves the following steps 
(Xu, 2005). Initially, the poverty line (PL) and the household subsistence spending (SE) should 
be calculated. SE refers to the minimum requirement for a household to maintain the basic life 
standards in a society and PL is used in the analysis as SE. Various poverty indicators have 
been developed in the previous literature, but none of them is perfect, depending on the place 
and period of study.  However, following the methodology by Xu (2005) the food as share of 
the total household expenditures for estimating SE is used. The PL in that case is defined as 
the food expenditure share to be within 45th and 55th percentile of the total sample. Then the 
equivalence household scale is taken which is: 

hh hhsizeeqsize                                                                                                                                      (1) 
The parameter β has been estimated from previous studies based on 59 countries’ household 
surveys data, and it is equal at 0.56 (Xu, 2005). The next step is to divide each household food 
expenditure ( hfoodex ) by the equivalent household size to get the equivalised food 
expenditures (eqfoodh): 
h
h
h eqsize
foodex
eqfood                                                                                                                                  (2) 
Then the food expenditure shares of total household expenditure that are at the 45th and 55th 
percentile across the whole sample, are calculated and are defined as foodex_45 and foodex_55. 
The next step is to calculate the weighted average of food expenditure in the 45th to 55th 
percentile range. In order to get subsistence expenditure per capita and which is also the poverty 
line (PL) as: 
5545 foodex_foodexfoodex_for
w
eqfoodw
PL h
h
hh





	                                                      (3) 
Then the subsistence expenditure (SE) for each household is: 
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hh eqsizePLSE                                                                                                                                      (4) 
The household is regarded as poor when the total household expenditure is smaller than its 
subsistence spending (SE): 
hhh
hhh
SEpoor
SEpoor


expif
expif
0
1
                                                                                                                        (5) 
The next steps involve the calculation for OOPEs. Firstly, the household capacity to pay (CTP) 
is calculated which is defined as a household non-subsistence spending and it is: 
hhhhh
hhhhh
foodexSEfoodexCTP
foodexSESECTP


ifexp
ifexp
                                                                                            (6) 
Then the OOPEs is the share over the CTP and it is: 
h
h
CTP
OOPECTPOOPE _                                                                                                                             (7) 
Then the catastrophic health expenditures constructed as a dummy variable taking value 
1 whether a household faces catastrophic expenditure at 40% threshold and 0 otherwise 
and it is defined as: 
400
401
._if
._if


CTPOOPECataEx
CTPOOPECataEx
h
h
                                                                                                       (8) 
3.2.2 Ordinary Least Squares and Ordered Logit Models 
In the first section the determinants of the OOPE are examined using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression. The model is defined as:  
tjhijtjtjhitjhitjhi TAAγ'ZyOOPECTP ,,,,,,,,,,,, )log(   10                                   (9) 
OOPECTP denotes the out-of-pocket health expenditures over the capacity to pay for 
individual i in household h, area location j and in time t. The variable log(y) is the logarithm of 
the household income. However, the regression examines also wealth index or quintiles of 
wealth.  Vector Z includes the rest of the explanatory variables, such as sex, age, education, 
marital status, household size, employment status, house tenure, whether a person is disable or 
not, whether an individual has health coverage and if yes what type (e.g. public or private) and 
others. In addition, toilet facilities are very important to disease control and health 
improvement, affecting health expenditures. Also barriers to health care access, such as the 
difficulties to access the health centers because of distance, are examined. Finally, lifestyle 
variables, such as Body Mass Index (BMI) and smoking are included in the analysis.  Aj 
controls for area, θt controls for time-year of the survey, while AjT is a wave area specific trend 
which controls for time-invariant unobserved characteristics in the area.  
In the case of catastrophic health expenditures, a standard Probit and Logit model is initially 
estimated, where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the household’s total OOPE 
exceeds the threshold level (i.e. if the household experienced catastrophic health expenditure) 
and 0 otherwise. The Probit or Logit model takes the following form (Greene, 2011): 
tjhijtjtjhitjhitjhi TAAγ'yCataEx ,,,,,,,,,,,, Z)log(   10                                         (10) 
In this case model (10) is defined as model (9) with the exception that the dependent variable 
now is binary and is defined as the catastrophic health expenditures (CataEx).  Models (9) and 
(10) examine at the same time the effects of health reforms. Thus, in regressions considering 
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different thresholds for catastrophic health expenditures and time periods, as before and after, 
the health reforms will take place.  
However, another issue is the possible selection bias coming from the self-selection on health 
expenditures or heterogeneity between individuals with health coverage or not.  In order to 
address the selection bias of spending on OOPEs, a Heckman two-stage procedure could be 
implemented. In that case the Heckman selection two-stage procedure is constituted by two 
equations; firstly, by the equation which describes the relationship between the outcome of 
interest yi (i.e. the OOPEs) and a vector of covariates Xi, and second, the selection equation, 
describing the relationship between a binary participation decision in a health insurance 
program Di and another vector of covariates Zi. The selection equation can include the health 
insurance type, the household type, health status and socio-economic characteristics such as 
education and employment status and location area such as rural or urban. However, since 
Heckman model may present biases (see Elwert and Winship for more details on Heckman 
model and endogenous selection bias) a propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983) is followed instead of the Heckman model. Based on the methodology discussed the 
effect of 2008 health reform on OOPEs, OOPECTP and catastrophic health expenditures is 
examined.  
In Turkey the Health Transformation Program (HTP) initially took place in 2003. One main 
characteristic of the HTP is that coverage of Green Card has been widened including low-
income groups and the health care services and pharmaceutical expenses for the Green Card 
holders are covered by the state. In addition, the VAT of pharmaceutical products has been 
reduced resulting to a discount of pharmaceutical expenses and consequently reducing the 
burden for public and citizens. It is claimed that HTP was successful in expanding health 
insurance coverage for all population -especially the poor people- and in improving access to 
health services -especially in rural areas (Chakraborty, 2009).  However, for the 
implementation of the reform it was a pre-requisite that the government of Turkey should 
prepare a universal health insurance law that will combine all the different health insurance 
schemes into one. This law took years and has been adopted by the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly in 2006. However, the implementation of this law started after 2007. In addition, 
with the implementation of HTP, the preventive health care and mother-child health care 
services have been strengthened, as well as, family medicine implementation took place. This 
is a program which has been spread out in the whole country and its purpose is the 
understanding of modern health, such as lifestyle, health diet and others. Furthermore, HTP 
tried to expand the coverage in both formal health sector insurance schemes (SSK, Emekli 
Sandığı and Bağkur) and the Green Card program. Finally, the Green Card Holders in 2008 
enjoy the same benefits with the enrollees in other health insurance schemes.  More 
specifically, the contribution to the formal health sector insurance schemes has been expanded 
from 59 per cent of the population to 69 per cent of the population in 2008, while the number 
of Green Card beneficiaries has been increased from 2.5 million in 2003 to 9.5 million on 2008.  
Contributing the existing literature which so far analyzed the effect of 2003 and 2006 reforms 
rather than the 2008 health reform, this study will analyze the impact of it on OOPEs, 
OOPECTP and catastrophic health expenditures applying a differences-in-differences (DID) 
framework as:  
tjhijtjtjhitjhi TAAγ'ZPostTreatPostTreatOOPE ,,,,,,321,,, *                (11) 
The regression is defined as in (9), where Z includes also income and wealth, while Treat is 
the treatment variable taking value 1 for those who are treated from the reform and 0 otherwise. 
Two possible treated groups can be examined. The first refers to poor people in rural areas 
taking value 1 and 0 for poor people located in urban areas. The reason why this can be 
considered it that with the HTP reform, emergency health care services have been implemented 
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also in villages and general practitioners, vaccinations, health care services at home have been 
increased.  Second, as this reform mainly concerns the poor and disadvantaged people, the 
Green Card holders are examined, where value 1 indicates households with Green Card and 0 
otherwise.  Post is the period dummy, taking value 1 if the year is after 2007 and 0 before 2008. 
Finally, the interaction term Treat*Post is the DID estimator which is the main interest. If the 
DID estimator is negative and significant implies that the OOPEs have been reduced in the 
treatment group after the HTP implementation relatively to the untreated-control group. 
Moreover, the data allow us to examine the effects of the reform after the economic and 
financial crisis of 2008 and the macro shocks associated whose severity outcomes became 
obvious in 2009.  Similarly, the catastrophic health expenditures can be examined, where in 
this case a binary logistic DID regression will be estimated.     
Since the estimates may suffer from selection bias the estimates are based on a pseudo-panel 
analysis using propensity score matching and taking individual fixed effects on the matched 
sample. The reason of considering matching comes from the fact that those who are eligible 
for Green Card and consist the treated group may have significant different characteristics than 
the individuals and their households that have public health insurance. The most important 
difference is the income, since those who have a higher income, as well as, those who are 
employed are more able and therefore more likely to have public health insurance. Moreover, 
the two groups may differ in other characteristics, including age, education and employment 
status. More specifically, the more educated people they might be more able to find a better 
job which is associated with higher income. Similarly, those who are employed are more likely 
to be eligible for public health insurance, while the disabled or the unemployed may belong to 
the lower-income groups and poor social classes who are eligible for the Green Card program. 
A similar logic holds also for those who are located in urban and rural areas.  
Matching has become a popular approach for the causal treatment effects estimation and it is 
widely applied for the evaluation of a variety of policies and has been used in very diverse 
fields of study, including labor, health and environmental policies.  The first problem that arises 
in many situations, as well as, in this study is the effect of the health reform of 2008 on the 
treated group and to investigate the difference between this group and the control-that is 
without treatment. One very common approach is to obtain the mean outcome of the treated 
and control or to apply straightforward a DID analysis as in (11). However, this is not advisable 
and it is believed in this study that there is a selection bias problem, as it has been mentioned 
above, that some individuals have a higher probability of entering the public health insurance 
system and thus to have a lower amount of OOPEs. This study is one of the few studies so far 
that accounts for selection bias and applies a propensity score matching within a DID 
framework.  The matching approach thus is one possible solution to the selection issue and 
through the statistical literature it shows a close link to the experimental context. The main idea 
is simple and is to find a group of non-treated individuals (public health insurance in this case) 
who share similar individual and household characteristics with the treated or the participant 
(the ones who are Green Card holders). If this being done efficiently then the differences in the 
outcome of interest of the selected groups can be attributed to the health reform. 
3.2.3 Propensity score matching  
Regarding the Matching of participants and non participants based on their estimated 
propensity scores will be p(x)≡P(C=1|x). Rosenbaum und Rubin (1983) show that if the 
Conditional Indepedence Assumption (CIA) holds then: 
   0),(|1),(| 00  CxpyECxpyE                                                                                            (12) 
Hence, matching of participants and non participants based on propensity scores is sufficient. 
The Mahalanobis algorithm is used.   
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However, the assumptions of the matching process are discussed. Conditional Independence 
Assumption:  The first possible and most important identification strategy assumed in the 
propensity score matching is the CIA. This assumption implies that given a set of observable 
covariates which are not affected by the policy or the treatment, then the potential outcomes of 
interest are independent of the treatment assignment. 
Conditional Independence Assumption:  The first possible and most important identification 
strategy assumed in the propensity score matching is the CIA. This assumption implies that 
given a set of observable covariates X which are not affected by the policy or the treatment, 
then the potential outcomes of interest are independent of the treatment assignment. In other 
words, CIA implies that the selection is solely based on the observable characteristics and that 
all the variables that may influence the treated or policy assignment and the potential outcomes 
of interest are observed by the researcher. For the purpose of this study it is assumed that the 
CIA holds. The unconfoundedness is: 
XXDyy ,|, 10                                                                                                                                (13) 
Relation (13) implies that the the potential outcomes are indepedent from the treatment 
assignment or the treated group given a set of vocariates X. Within the propensity score 
matching then (13) and unconfoundedness based on the propensity score can be written as: 
XXPDyy ),(|, 10                                                                                                                         (14) 
Nevertheless, there are issues and drawbacks using matching. The first is the issue of 
unobservable that are not included into the matching process and into the DID analysis. The 
second is the assumption that the covariates included into the matching process are enough to 
create comparable treated and control groups. However, the majority of the econometric 
models suffer from this issues. For example, there are unobservable characteristics in 
randomized trial experiments and the natural experiments, as is out case, where unobservables 
may affect the outcomes and the matching. Regarding the second issue, many models may not 
control for various variables, as well as, the regressions may suffer from plausible, over-
control, confounding and selections biases. 
Common Support: This is another requirement besides the independence, which rules out the 
phenomenon of the perfect predictability of the D given a set of covariates X 
1)|1(0  XDP                                                                                                                              (15) 
Another aspect of the matching process is the model choice, where it is common practice to 
employ discrete choice models when the treatment is a binary variable. Preference is given to 
Logit or Probit estimates, where the estimated probability of the participation or the policy 
treatment usually is almost identical.   
Model choice: Another aspect of the matching process is the model choice, where it is common 
practice to employ discrete choice models when the treatment is a binary variable. Preference 
is given to Logit or Probit estimates, where the estimated probability of the participation or the 
policy treatment usually are identical.   
Variable choice: Another important element of the matching process refers to the inclusion or 
exclusion of the covariates in the propensity score model, where according to the CIA it is 
required that the outcome variable of interest must be independent of the treatment conditional 
on the propensity score. Therefore, the implementation of matching requires that the set of the 
covariates X should credibly satisfy this condition. According to Heckman et al. (1997), 
omitting important variables can seriously increase bias in resulting estimates, and only 
variables that influence simultaneously the participation decision and the outcome variable 
should be included. The justification of the variables choice in our study comes from the fact 
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that these covariates are observed before and after the participation and they can influence both 
outcome and the participation into the policy program, which is the Green Card. Variables, 
such as age, education level, marital and job status and area are some of the variables used into 
the matching process that can influence both OOPEs and the participation into the program as 
the results provide evidence in the empirical results section.  
4. Data 
The data used in this study are the Turkish Household Budget Survey (HBS), available from 
Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIJ) during the period 2002 to 2011, which are a time-series of 
repeated cross sections. The survey includes three main groups of variables: variables relating 
to household assets (e.g. type of dwelling and ownership, ownership of durables and 
transportation vehicles), expenditure on consumption (e.g. food and health expenditure), and 
variables related to individuals (e.g. age, marital status, employment status and education 
among others).  
In table 1 the summary statistics for the CataEx and health insurance type are presented, while 
in table 2 the correlation matrix among these variables is reported.  
In table 1 the summary statistics for the catastrophic health expenditures (CataEx) for various 
households and the percentage of the insured individuals are presented. It becomes obvious 
that the average CataEx are very low during the period examined, especially for the 40% 
threshold. However, the percentage of CataEx and threshold 40% was only 0.8 in 2002 and 
0.49 in 2011, while for threshold 30% the percentage of CataEx 2.47% in 2002 and 0.61% in 
2011. The majority of the sample has public health insurance at 63.10%, while only 6.76% is 
privately insured. A high percentage of the population is green card holders at 13.24% and the 
16.91% has no health insurance.  
In table 2 the correlation among household income, various thresholds of catastrophic health 
expenditures, education and the type of health insurance are reported. As it was expected, a 
positive relationship among the CataEx at various thresholds, as well as, a negative association 
among the health insurance types is presented. Both public and private health insurance 
schemes are negatively associated with the probability of a catastrophic health expenditure, 
while the latter is positively associated for Green card holders and those with no health 
insurance. In addition, education is negatively associated with the probability of CataEx 
occurrence. Household income is positively related to both private and public health insurance 
schemes and negatively to Green Card holders and no-insured, as it was expected.  
Following the previous literature (Van Doorslaer et al., 2007; Mugisha et al., 2007; Barros and 
Bertoldi, 2008; Erus and Aktakke, 2012; Brown et al., 2014) the regressions control for various 
individual and household characteristics, including gender, age, education level, household 
income, marital and job status, occupation industry code, rural versus urban area, years of 
working, years of leaving in the current residence, difficulties in access to transportation points 
and health centers and year. These controls are useful, since education, job status, years of work 
and household income may cause the decision and the type of health insurance.  
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Health insurance types and determinants of OOPECTP and catastrophic health 
expenditures  
In this section, the empirical results are presented and discussed.  In table 3, some initial OLS 
estimates for the OOPECTP are reported.  A first conclusion is that the OOPECTP do not 
depend on the gender, as well as, age presents a positive and significant relationship with 
OOPECTP in linear terms, but the quadratic terms are insignificant in all cases. Columns (1)-
(4) use the same dependent variable, but additional controls or factors are considered. For 
instance in columns (2)-(4) the industry codes are included, while column (2) includes wealth, 
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while column (3) considers the accessibility level to health centers and transportation points 
and finally in column (4), the health status of the respondent is additionally included. The 
number of observations differ among the regressions, as there are fewer observations answering 
the accessibility level. At a first glance, it seems that in all estimates the OOPECTP level does 
not differ between health insurance types, with the exception those who have not health 
insurance and are more likely to spend more to OOPECTP.  Marital status does not differ with 
the exception when the accessibility level is included in (2) and those who are married when 
the wealth and health status are considered. This may reflect the fact that married can have 
more obligations and more expenses, while controlling for respondents with health problems 
and the disabled probably increase the household health expenditures. Education level, 
household income, household size and wealth are negatively associated with OOPECTP. This 
is expected as those factors may be strongly related to each other as higher educated people 
have more skills and more opportunities in the labor market resulting to higher income and in 
long term in higher wealth level. Additional regressions also took place including the working 
experience and dwelling size but the results on health insurance type and concluding remarks 
remain the same. Household size has also a negative coefficient implying that it is plausible 
that large families support each other reducing in this way the OOPECTP. Nevertheless, the 
quality of family relationships, togetherness and the degree of support are important factors 
that could be included as proxies; but are not available in the dataset. Industry codes of the 
respondent’s occupation have been included, where those who are employed in the sector of 
hotels and restaurants are more likely to spend less in OOPECTP than the reference category 
which is the agriculture sector. This is also confirmed by the estimated coefficient of the urban 
area which is negative. This may also indicate that people residing in urban areas have more 
labor market opportunities resulting to higher income and wealth levels, as well as, better 
quality of health centers and access to them and to transportation points as the regression results 
show in column (3). More specifically those who reported that they can very easily access to 
transportation points and health centers spend lower levels of OOPECTP.  Therefore, 
transportation accessibility can also be an important factor since many people may reside in 
isolated and small areas, where the location of health centers is significantly further than their 
residence, as well as, some or many of them may not have available transportation mean, 
making for them more difficult and more expensive to access to the transportation points 
leading to OOPECTP increases.   
For this reason, the health reform in 2008 is also explored. As it has been mentioned in the 
introduction, the Green Card holders have the opportunity of access to the same health services 
as those with public insurance, while also the road and service infrastructure in the rural areas 
has been improved in 2008.  
The results overall are consistent with the study by Brown et al. (2014); however, our analysis 
is expanded examining all the health insurance types, including the accessibility to health 
centers and transportation, wealth, as well as, the DID approach will be applied in order to see 
the effectiveness of the health reform of 2008. However, these estimates are not based on 
propensity score matching; thus it is highly possible that there is selection bias and 
heterogeneity in the sample. For this reason, the following estimates are reported after the 
matching process. Various algorithms have been estimated and the results remain robust, but 
the results reported are based on the Mahalanobis metric algorithm. 
In table 4, the Probit selection equation for various health insurance types are presented. More 
specifically, regarding columns (1)-(2), the dependent variable is a binary-dummy taking value 
1 if the respondents have private health insurance and 0 if they have public. In column (2), the 
accessibility level to health centers and transportation points is included. Similarly in columns 
(3)-(4), the dependent variable takes 1 if the respondent has no health insurance and 0 whether 
they have either public or private. Finally, in columns (5)-(6), the dummy obtains value 1 
  11
whether the respondents are green card holders and 0 if they have no health insurance. The 
reason for implementing these dummies is the limitation of the propensity score since it allows 
for one treatment and one effect and it would be difficult to distinguish all the four health type 
insurance. Thus, in columns (1)-(2) the determinants of the private versus the public health 
insurance are explored in order to examine also their effects on OOPE and catastrophic health 
expenditures (CataEx). Similarly, the purpose of the estimates in columns (3)-(4) is to examine 
the determinants of those with insurance and those without, and what is the additional OOPEs 
paid. Finally, the green card holders versus the respondents with no health insurance are 
examined in order to see the potential benefits of this scheme to OOPEs and CataEx.  
Gender is not significant regarding the choice between public and private, but women are less 
likely to have no insurance or are less likely to be Green Card holders according to columns 
(5)-(6). The former can be explained that women are more likely to have a public or private 
health insurance because they are usually covered by their husband or other family members, 
for instance young women are covered by their father’s insurance. Nevertheless, this depends 
on various other factors, such as the household income.  On the other hand, women are more 
likely to be uninsured than green card holders. This may be derived by the fact that some 
women belong to rich households that do not need health insurance or more possible are not 
employed or working in agriculture and rural areas where households are not insured.  
Age, household income, wealth, education level, as well as, those who are married and located 
in urban areas, in all cases have a negative and significant coefficient. This implies that more 
educated, richer, wealthier and married people are more likely to choose public versus private 
or no-insurance, and less likely to be green card holders than uninsured. The latter can probably 
be explained for the reasons mentioned above, such as these households are rich and wealthy 
and they do not need health insurance, since they can spend on private medical doctors. Those 
who are not employed are more likely to choose public health insurance and green card, as in 
the latter case green card refers to poor people and the unemployed status probably reflect this 
situation.  
Dwelling size presents the same sign with household income and education, but it is positive 
in columns (1)-(2) which positively associated with the probability that the respondent has a 
private health insurance.  This may reflect the wealthy state of these households even when the 
regressions control for the wealth index show a negative coefficient. Regarding the 
accessibility level, columns (1)-(2) show that those who reported that the access to health 
centers is easy, are more likely to choose public health over the private health insurance and 
green card over the no-health insurance, indicating that accessibility is an important factor for 
the type of health insurance selection, which has been ignored in previous studies. On the other 
hand, the access to transportation points seems to be insignificant. Nevertheless, there is a 
strong heterogeneity among the samples examined as it was expected.  
In table 5, the results show that those who have a private health insurance spend on average 14 
Turkish Liras (TL) more than those with public health coverage, while those without health 
insurance coverage pay on average 6TL more than the respondents who have either public or 
private health insurance. In addition, the OOPECTP levels are higher for uninsured people. On 
the other hand, the green card holders spend less health expenditures than those with no health 
insurance by 12.5 TL and they have low OOPECTP levels.  Moreover, the private health 
insurers are more likely to have CataEx at 20%, 30% and 40% thresholds than the respective 
respondents with public health insurance, while the difference at 10% threshold is insignificant. 
Similarly, those who are uninsured have the probability of facing CataEx at all thresholds, with 
the exception of 40% which is the level  defined by the WHO. The same results hold for the 
Green Card holders, where they present a lower likelihood of facing CataEx at various 
thresholds examined, except from 40%.   
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Furthermore, table 6 reports some estimates of a regression that use dummies which take 1 for 
the health insurance of interest and 0 otherwise.  In this case, it is clear that those who have 
public health insurance spend less health expenditures and have lower levels of OOPECTP. In 
addition, while there is no difference of the public health insurance with the other types of 
health insurance at the 10% of the catastrophic health expenditures, it becomes significant in 
the rest of the thresholds and there is a lower probability of catastrophic health expenditures 
occurrence. On the other hand, there is no difference between private insurance with the rest 
of the insurance types, as well as, no difference between green card holders and the remained 
types. Regarding the respondents with no health insurance pay on average 8.5 TL and they face 
higher levels of OOPECTP by 0.0054. Finally, in all the thresholds examined, the probability 
of catastrophic expenditures occurrence is significantly higher for those with no health 
insurance coverage and the probability is monotonically decreasing.  
In table 7 the test of the propensity score matching considering various health insurance classes 
are reported. In the majority of the estimates the groups share similar characteristics. However, 
the marital status which is significantly difference among the groups examined, with the 
exception the groups of Green card holders versus those with no health insurance and the green 
card holders versus all the others.  The wealth index is significantly different for the groups 
public versus other health insurance; private versus any other health insurance type; and the 
non-insurance group versus all the others. Finally, employment status is only significantly 
different between the groups of publish and private health insurers. The propensity score 
matching results are based on the CIA as it has been discussed in the methodology section and 
it is based on the observables variables. However, it should be noticed that the matching process 
is not without drawbacks since the individuals-agents may choose the insurance type based on 
unobservable characteristics like trust, quality of family support, relations and togetherness and 
the individual and family medical history, which is not available in the dataset. Nevertheless, 
the estimates are not significantly differing with the unmatched sample, as the analysis is relied 
on a quasi-experimental approach, which is the health reform of 2008. Moreover, this approach 
along with the randomized trial experiments and the natural experiments present the common 
problems of not considering the unobservable characteristics, followed in the majority of 
previous research studies.  
5.2 Differences-in-Differences (DID) on health reforms 
In this section, the estimates of DID, which is employed to understand the effect of 2008 health 
reform, are presented. In the first case, the treatment group is the individuals who are green 
card holders, while the control group is those who have public health insurance. It should be 
noticed that those who are uninsured or have private health coverage are not included because 
the health reform in 2008 refers to changes that are applied to Green Card holders and 
specifically they are entitled after this period to the same services with those who have public 
health insurance coverage (OECD, 2008). Since this is not related to the uninsured, as well as, 
to those with private health insurance, the study is limited to these two groups-public health 
insurance and green card. A pseudo-panel based on propensity score matching is used. The 
DID estimates for this case are reported in table 8.  
In table 8 and panel A, the DID estimates for the green card holders as treated and those who 
have public health insurance as control group for OOPECTP are reported, while the DID 
estimates for the same treated-control group for OOPEs are presented in panel B. In both cases, 
the results show that there is no difference between the treated and control group, while the 
OOPECTP and OOPEs have been reduced after 2007. Concluding in both cases, the OOPECTP 
and OOPEs levels between the treated and the control group have been reduced due to the 
health reform of 2008. In addition, in panels C and D the placebo tests for the DID, taking as 
the year of health reform 2007 instead of 2008 are reported, implying that the DID can be 
robust, since the DID coefficient is insignificant.  
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In panels E and F, the OOPECTP and OOPEs are reported where the treated group is those 
with public health insurance located in rural areas, while the control group is again those who 
have public health coverage but are located in urban areas. In this case, the DID is also 
significant and negative indicating that the OOPECTP have been reduced in the treatment 
group relatively to the control, always regarding the sample of the household budget survey 
used in this study, but there is no significant difference concerning the OOPEs.  Furthermore, 
based on the placebo test and OOPEs, the results show that the DID is robust, while concerning 
the OOPECTP, the DID is positive and significant, indicating that before the reform, the 
difference of OOPECTP between urban and rural areas is increased, where they were higher in 
the latter area.   
Finally, in figure 1, the parallel trend assumption is presented taking as treated the green card 
holders and control those with public health insurance. The figure 1 refers to the OOPEs, while 
figure 2 refers to the OOPECTP. 
In figure 3 the histogram for the OOPEs is presented. It becomes obvious that the distribution 
is skewed, while the histogram for the logarithm of the OOPEs is presented in figure 4. 
Similarly, the same conclusion is derived by the figures 5-6 for the OOPEs over the capacity 
to pay, and for this reason the estimates in table 8 and DID are re-estimated considering the 
logarithm of the OOPEs over the capacity to pay. In table 9 the DID estimates for the 
OOPECTP and OOPEs and considering the green card holders as the treated group and those 
with public health insurance as the control group, are reported. Based on the DID coefficient 
in both cases the difference in the OOPECTP and OOPEs between the Green card holders and 
those with public health insurance has been reduced respectively by 21 and 26 per cent.  
Similarly, in table 10, the DID estimates with Logit fixed effects and catastrophic health 
expenditures are reported. Regarding the thresholds 10 and 20 per cent, there is no difference 
between treated and control group, while the treated group at thresholds 30 and 40 per cent are 
more likely to face catastrophic health expenditures. In all cases the post period coefficients 
are negative and significant, indicating that CataEx have been reduced, while the DID 
coefficient is also negative and significant and monotonically decreasing, implying that the 
difference of CataEx probability occurrence between the treated and control group has been 
reduced.  
6. Conclusions 
This study examines various topics on OOPEs and catastrophic health expenditures in Turkey 
during the period 2002-2013 and aims to answer in various research questions. The first aim is 
to analyse which are the most important factors that determine people and their capability to 
choose the type of health insurance. Second, the effects of the health insurance type on OOPEs 
and their probability of the catastrophic health expenditures in various threshold levels are 
explored. The findings show that in all cases, public health insurance offers a protection to the 
individuals and households regarding the OOPEs and the health expenditure levels. In addition, 
those who are green card holders spend less on OOPEs comparatively with those who are 
uninsured, while the last group is more probable to spend more on health expenditures, to 
present higher levels of OOPEs and to be more likely that they face catastrophic health 
expenditures. Although there might be a chance that some households belonging to the 
uninsured group can be rich and wealthy, this possibility cannot be valid anymore after the 
propensity score matching, since it allows us to compare only the households who are poor. It 
is therefore concluded that green card scheme offers a protection over catastrophic health 
expenditures and OOPEs to the people who are green card holders while such a protection does 
not exist for the uninsured people. Overall, the catastrophic health expenditures in Turkey are 
really low and have been significantly reduced during the period examined.  
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Next the study explored the effect of the health reform in 2008, where green card holders are 
entitled to the same health services with those who have public health coverage, as well as, the 
infrastructure is improved and the emergency services are expanded in the rural areas (OECD, 
2008). The findings show that the OOPEs and OOPECTP between the treated group-the green 
card holders- and the control group –public health insurance- have been reduced, indicating 
that the policy of green card and its expansion in 2008 was a successful policy that has reduced 
the OOPEs and catastrophic health expenditures in this sensitive group. The results also show 
that besides the socio-economic characteristics that have been examined in other studies, such 
as age, income and other factors, a very important factor is the accessibility level to health 
centres and transportation points. Since many people need a private transportation, in the case 
where the accessibility to public transportation is difficult or no convenient, as well as, the 
distance to health centres and their accessibility level, can increase the OOPEs. Another 
importation factor that have also been explored in previous studies, is the disability, illness or 
different health problems of a person in the household, which is positively associated with the 
probability of seeking health care and increasing OOPEs.   
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Figure 1: Parallel Trend Assumption for OOPEs 
	
	
	
Figure 2: Parallel Trend Assumption for OOPECTP 
	
	
	
	
  18
Figure 3: Histogram for OOPEs 
		
	
	
	
Figure 4: Histogram for Logarithm of OOPEs 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
0
2.0
e-0
4
4.0
e-0
4
6.0
e-0
4
8.0
e-0
4
De
ns
ity
0 20000 40000 60000 80000OOPEs
0
.05
.1
.15
.2
.25
De
ns
ity
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0
Log of OOPEs
  19
Figure 5: Histogram for OOPEs over the Capacity to Pay 
	
	
Figure 6 Histogram for the Logarithm of OOPEs over the Capacity to Pay 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Above 10% Below 10%  Above 20% Below 20% 
Catastrophic health 
expenditures 
10.83 89.17 Catastrophic health 
expenditures 
3.81 96.19 
 Above 30% Below 30%  Above 40% Below 40% 
Catastrophic health 
expenditures 
1.57 98.43 Catastrophic health 
expenditures 
0.65 99.35 
 Public Private Green Card No Health 
insurance 
 
Health Insurance 63.09 6.76 13.24 16.91  
	
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
 CataEx 10% CataEx 20% CataEx 30%CataEx 40% Household 
Income 
Public 
Health 
Insurance 
Private 
Health 
Insurance 
Green Card 
Holders 
No Health 
Insurance 
CataEx 20% 0.5715*** 
(0.000) 
        
CataEx 30% 0.3627*** 
(0.000) 
0.6346*** 
(0.000) 
       
CataEx 40% 0.2322*** 
(0.000) 
0.4063*** 
(0.000) 
0.6401*** 
(0.000) 
      
Household 
Income 
0.0253*** 
(0.000) 
0.0158*** 
(0.000) 
0.0159*** 
(0.000) 
0.0050** 
(0.0317) 
     
Public Health 
Insurance 
-0.0770*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0602*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0417*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0262*** 
(0.000) 
0.0413*** 
(0.000) 
    
Private Health 
Insurance 
-0.0158*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0116*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0122*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0055** 
(0.0184) 
0.0101*** 
(0.000) 
-0.3522*** 
(0.000) 
   
Green Card 
Holders 
0.0415*** 
(0.000) 
0.0256*** 
(0.000) 
0.0207*** 
(0.000) 
0.0115*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0988*** 
(0.000) 
-0.5107*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1052*** 
(0.000) 
  
No Health 
Insurance 
0.0750*** 
(0.000) 
0.0644*** 
(0.000) 
0.0450*** 
(0.000) 
0.0280*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0415*** 
(0.000) 
-0.5897*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1215*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1762*** 
(0.000) 
 
Education  -0.0588*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0520*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0367*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0240*** 
(0.000) 
0.0580*** 
(0.000) 
0.2021*** 
(0.000) 
0.0034** 
(0.0432) 
-0.1999*** 
(0.0432) 
-0.0848*** 
(0.0432) 
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Table 3: OLS Estimates for Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditures over the Capacity to 
Pay 
VARIABLES OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) 
Gender (Female) -0.0002 0.0012 -0.00001 0.00001 
 (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Age 0.0001* -0.0000 -0.0002 0.0004** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Age Square -0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 
 (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Health Insurance (reference Public)     
Health Insurance -Private 0.0011 -0.0026 0.0004 0.0011 
 (0.0008) (0.0026) (0.0011) (0.0012) 
Health Insurance-Green Card 0.0060*** -0.0001 0.0041*** 0.0046*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Health Insurance-No Health insurance 0.0069*** 0.0036*** 0.0060*** 0.0080*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
Logarithm of Household Income -0.0036*** -0.0040*** -0.0028*** -0.0037*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Marital Status (Never Married)     
Marital Status-Married  0.0008 0.0009 0.0015* 0.0020** 
 (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
Marital Status-Widowed -0.0003 0.0071* 0.0037 0.0043 
 (0.0012) (0.0043) (0.0028) (0.0031) 
Marital Status-Divorced -0.0010 0.0041 0.0033 0.0038 
 (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0024) 
Education Level (reference Illiterate)      
Education Level-Not completed school -0.0025*** 0.0032 -0.0012 -0.0016 
 (0.0009) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0020) 
Education Level-Primary School -0.0058*** -0.0041** -0.0043*** -0.0051*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0016) 
Education Level-Primary Education -0.0071*** -0.0022 -0.0041** -0.0051** 
 (0.0009) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0020) 
Education Level-Secondary School -0.0074*** -0.0042* -0.0045*** -0.0056*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0018) 
Education Level-High School  -0.0074*** -0.0034 -0.0048*** -0.0059*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0018) 
Education Level-Senior School -0.0077*** -0.0025 -0.0055*** -0.0064*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0018) 
Education Level-College -0.0070*** -0.0031 -0.0050*** -0.0058*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0024) (0.0018) (0.0020) 
Education Level-University -0.0042*** 0.0018 -0.0023 -0.0028 
 (0.0010) (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0020) 
Industry Codes (reference Agriculture, hunting, 
forestry) 
    
Industry Codes -Fishing  0.0016 0.0029** 0.0031** 
  (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0013) 
Industry Codes- Mining  -0.0010 0.0018** 0.0022** 
  (0.0017) (0.0007) (0.0010) 
Industry Codes- Manufacturing  0.00004 0.0011 0.0012 
  (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0014) 
Industry Codes- Construction  -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0010 
  (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0013) 
Industry Codes- Wholesale and retail business  0.0026 0.0030** 0.0038*** 
  (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0014) 
Industry Codes- Hotel and restaurants  -0.0027* -0.0023* -0.0026** 
  (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0013) 
Industry Codes- Transportation  0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0005 
  (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0014) 
Industry Codes- Financial Services  -0.0015 -0.0002 -0.0002 
  (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0014) 
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Table 3 (cont.): OLS Estimates for Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditures over the 
Capacity to Pay 
VARIABLES OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) 
House tenure (reference owner)     
House tenure-Tenant -0.0027*** -0.0005 -0.0013** -0.0015** 
 (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
House tenure-Lodging -0.0041*** -0.0048** -0.0030* -0.0030* 
 (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0017) 
House tenure-Other -0.0021*** -0.0003 -0.0017** -0.0020** 
 (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Household Size -0.0004*** -0.0004* -0.0004*** -0.0003** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Access to Health centres (reference very difficult)     
Access to Health centres-Difficult  -0.0005   
  (0.0020)   
Access to Health centres-Easily  -0.0029   
  (0.0020)   
Access to Health centres-Very Easily  -0.0039*   
  (0.0023)   
Access to Transportation Points (reference very difficult)     
Access to Transportation Points-Difficult   -0.0031   
  (0.0021)   
Access to Transportation Points-Easily  -0.0027   
  (0.0024)   
Access to Transportation Points-Very Easily  -0.0033*   
  (0.0020)   
Urban Area -0.0110*** -0.0063*** -0.0081*** -0.0092*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
Employed (No) 0.0012***    
 (0.0004)    
Wealth   -0.0009***  
   (0.0002)  
Limited activities because of mental or physical health 
problems (No) 
   -0.0174*** 
(0.0038) 
     
Observations 139,705 27,152 61,506 55,783 
R-squared 0.2739 0.1447 0.1943 0.1717 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	
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Table 4: Probit Selection Equations and Determinants of Different Types of Health 
Insurance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Private Vs 
Public 
Private Vs 
Public 
No 
Insurance 
Vs Pubic 
and Private 
No 
Insurance 
Vs Pubic 
and Private 
Green Card 
Vs No 
Insurance 
Green Card 
Vs No 
Insurance 
Gender (Female) 0.0027 0.0149 -0.1679*** -0.2441*** -0.0324*** -0.0500** 
 (0.0113) (0.0227) (0.0063) (0.0129) (0.0104) (0.0197) 
Age -0.0026*** -0.0068*** -0.0121*** -0.0149*** -0.0016*** 0.0022** 
 (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0009) 
Logarithm of Household Income -0.0969*** -0.1218*** -0.4010*** -0.2008*** -0.3586*** -0.2556*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0137) (0.0059) (0.0083) (0.0142) (0.0158) 
Marital Status (Never Married)       
Marital Status-Married  -0.0479*** 0.0695** -0.3025*** -0.3829*** 0.1658*** 0.1234*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0318) (0.0089) (0.0177) (0.0136) (0.0255) 
Marital Status-Widowed -0.1721*** -0.1610** -0.2016*** -0.5005*** 0.2332*** 0.3478*** 
 (0.0324) (0.0680) (0.0175) (0.0380) (0.0279) (0.0558) 
Marital Status-Divorced 0.0875* 0.1730** 0.3422*** 0.2274*** -0.0181 -0.0545 
 (0.0528) (0.0779) (0.0247) (0.0390) (0.0418) (0.0613) 
Education Level (reference Illiterate)        
Education Level-Not completed school -0.0425* 0.0462 -0.3361*** -0.0220 -0.0841*** -0.1837*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0517) (0.0134) (0.0305) (0.0166) (0.0354) 
Education Level-Primary School -0.0436** -0.0078 -0.1373*** -0.0053 -0.3025*** -0.5030*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0410) (0.0103) (0.0236) (0.0143) (0.0292) 
Education Level-Primary Education -0.1482*** -0.0031 -0.4774*** -0.3771*** -0.2095*** -0.4013*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0565) (0.0149) (0.0313) (0.0203) (0.0384) 
Education Level-Secondary School -0.1689*** -0.0253 -0.2197*** -0.0333 -0.3827*** -0.6500*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0564) (0.0145) (0.0315) (0.0255) (0.0459) 
Education Level-High School  -0.2224*** 0.0458 -0.3002*** -0.1081*** -0.5425*** -0.7905*** 
 (0.0245) (0.0529) (0.0133) (0.0299) (0.0236) (0.0437) 
Education Level-Senior School -0.3177*** -0.0902 -0.3821*** -0.2029*** -0.7040*** -0.8815*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0587) (0.0176) (0.0323) (0.0377) (0.0528) 
Education Level-College -0.7266*** -0.1466** -0.4509*** -0.3189*** -1.0337*** -1.1444*** 
 (0.0496) (0.0742) (0.0242) (0.0413) (0.0733) (0.0956) 
Education Level-University -0.4591*** -0.1434** -0.4712*** -0.2925*** -1.1953*** -1.3873*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0561) (0.0208) (0.0372) (0.0738) (0.0954) 
Employed (No) -0.1368*** -0.0186 -0.1260*** 0.0155 0.1076*** 0.2237*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0231) (0.0067) (0.0134) (0.0105) (0.0195) 
House Size  0.0019*** 0.0016*** -0.0001 -0.0012*** -0.0025*** -0.0024*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Household Size 0.0382*** 0.0350*** 0.1137*** 0.0724*** 0.0676*** 0.0824*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0046) (0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0019) (0.0040) 
Wealth -0.0452*** -0.0509*** -0.1941*** -0.1549*** -0.0692*** -0.1232*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0099) (0.0024) (0.0052) (0.0029) (0.0069) 
Access to Health centres (reference very 
difficult) 
      
Access to Health centres-Difficult  0.0160  0.0265  -0.0728 
  (0.0633)  (0.0363)  (0.0453) 
Access to Health centres-Easily  -0.0138  0.0222  -0.0070 
  (0.0644)  (0.0364)  (0.0468) 
Access to Health centres-Very Easily  0.0297  -0.0070  0.0013 
  (0.0800)  (0.0456)  (0.0656) 
Access to Transportation Points (reference 
very difficult) 
      
Access to Transportation Points-Difficult
  
 -0.0856  -0.0417  0.1556*** 
  (0.0642)  (0.0373)  (0.0476) 
Access to Transportation Points-Easily  -0.1321**  -0.0363  0.0859* 
  (0.0647)  (0.0368)  (0.0480) 
Access to Transportation Points-Very 
Easily 
 -0.1856**  -0.0733  0.0707 
  (0.0798)  (0.0449)  (0.0650) 
Urban Area -0.0490*** -0.1119*** -0.0623*** -0.0977*** -0.0446*** -0.1270*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0245) (0.0063) (0.0144) (0.0101) (0.0214) 
Observations 252,507 88,633 327,288 99,778 107,790 24,825 
Wald chi square 38,364.67 
[0.000] 
2,655.314 
[0.000] 
26,031.78 
[0.000] 
7,930.50 
[0.000] 
16,465.08 
[0.000] 
4,155.62 
[0.000] 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, p-values within brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Propensity Score and Average Treatment Effects on Health Expenditures and 
OOPECTP for the Types of Health Insurance 
VARIABLES OOPEs OOPECTP CataEx 10% 
Threshold 
CataEx 20% 
Threshold 
CataEx 30% 
Threshold 
CataEx 40% 
Threshold 
Private Vs Public 14.662*** 0.0057*** 0.0117 0.0093** 0.0073*** 0.0030* 
 (4.708) (0.0017) (0.0081) (0.0045) (0.0025) (0.0016) 
 
No-Insurance Vs Public-Private 
 
6.6725*** 
 
0.0039*** 
 
0.0197*** 
 
0.0093*** 
 
0.0021** 
 
0.0009 
 (1.141) (0.0008) (0.0032) (0.0021) (0.0010) (0.0008) 
 
Green Card Vs No-Insurance 
 
-12.409*** 
 
-0.0063*** 
 
-0.0187*** 
 
-0.0178*** 
 
-0.0099*** 
 
-0.0013 
 (2.191) (0.0016) (0.0067) (0.0046) (0.0031) (0.0019) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	
	
	
	
Table 6: Propensity Score Matching and Average Treatment Effects 
VARIABLES OOPEs OOPECTP CataEx 10% 
Threshold 
CataEx 20% 
Threshold 
CataEx 30% 
Threshold 
CataEx 40% 
Threshold 
Public Vs Other -6.0988*** -0.0056*** -0.0046 -0.0090** -0.0031*** -0.0011** 
 (1.4613) (0.0004) (0.0033) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0005) 
 
Private Vs Other 
 
5.123 
 
0.0016 
 
-0.0082 
 
-0.0018 
 
-0.0008 
 
0.0005 
 (4.078) (0.0021) (0.0095) (0.0020) (0.0013) (0.0009) 
 
Green Card Vs Other 
 
0.5919 
 
0.0022 
 
-0.0053 
 
-0.0009 
 
0.0001 
 
-0.0004 
 (4.078) (0.0014) (0.0043) (0.0020) (0.0013) (0.0009) 
 
No-Insurance Vs Other 
 
8.523*** 
 
0.0054*** 
 
0.0141*** 
 
0.0110*** 
 
0.0041*** 
 
0.0014*** 
 (1.912) (0.0005) (0.0043) (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05	
	
	
	
Table 7: Test for Propensity Score before and After Matching 
 Private Vs 
Public 
No Insurance Vs 
Public-Private 
Green Card Vs 
No-Insurance 
Public Vs Other Private Vs 
Other 
Green Card Vs 
Other 
No-Insurance 
Vs Other 
Gender 0.66 
(0.507) 
1.33   
(0.184) 
-0.86   
(0.391) 
-1.41   
(0.158) 
1.52   
(0.129) 
-1.16   
(0.245) 
1.11   
(0.231) 
Age -1.17 
(0.244) 
1.54   
(0.115) 
-1.51   
(0.123) 
1.16  
 (0.315) 
-0.94   
(0.345) 
-1.25  
 (0.224) 
1.50   
(0.124) 
Household 
Income 
-0.44 
(0.662) 
1.30   
(0.172) 
0.91   
(0.361) 
0.32** 
(0.153) 
1.59  
 (0.121) 
-1.52   
(0.125) 
-1.55   
(0.116) 
Marital Status -1.99* 
(0.092) 
-1.79*  
(0.073) 
-5.25   
(0.000) 
-2.39**   
(0.017) 
-3.94***   
(0.000) 
-1.32  
 (0.187) 
-1.70*   
(0.089) 
Education 
level 
1.43 
(0.112) 
1.76**  
(0.081) 
-0.34   
(0.731) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
1.13  
 (0.314) 
1.70*   
(0.096) 
1.01   
(0.242) 
Employed -2.42** 
(0.024) 
-1.36   
(0.173) 
-0.31   
(0.759) 
0.46  
 (0.644) 
-0.33   
(0.745) 
1.26   
(0.209) 
-0.32   
(0.753) 
Household 
Size 
0.92 
(0.355) 
2.23   
(0.026) 
-1.61   
(0.108) 
2.71***   
(0.007) 
1.84*  
 (0.066) 
-1.10  
 (0.257) 
-1.19   
(0.235) 
Wealth 0.34  
 (0.732) 
1.02   
(0.293) 
-1.57   
(0.113) 
-1.91*   
(0.056) 
1.41  
 (0.146) 
-6.18***  
 (0.000) 
2.16**   
(0.031) 
Urban area -0.96   
(0.338) 
1.17  
(0.266) 
2.00** 
(0.045) 
-0.52   
(0.605) 
0.95   
(0.340) 
1.57   
(0.119) 
1.42   
(0.132) 
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	
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Table 8: DID for OOPECTP and OOPEs and Various Cases 
 Coefficients  Coefficients 
Panel A: Green Card Vs Public Health and 
OOPECTP 
 Panel B: Green Card Vs Public Health 
and OOPEs 
 
Treat (1 for Green Card, 0 for Public Health 
Insurance) 
0.0106 
(0.507) 
Treat (1 for Green Card, 0 for Public1) 
Health Insurance 
19.944 (17.002) 
Post-Period (1 for 2008 and after) -0.0783*** 
(0.0150) 
Post-Period (1 for 2008 and after) 27.540**  
(13.292) 
Treat*Post-Period -0.0294** 
(0.0142) 
Treat*Post-Period -34.691**  
(19.377) 
No. Observations 20,555 No. Observations 20,555 
R Square 0.1305 R Square 0.1427 
Panel C: Green Card Vs Public Health  
Placebo OOPECTP test 2007 
 Panel D: Green Card Vs Public Health  
Placebo OOPEs test 2007 
 
Treat (1 for Green Card, 0 for Public Health 
Insurance) 
0.0043 
(0.106) 
Treat (1 for Green Card, 0 for Public1) 
Health Insurance 
22.571  
(21.533) 
Post-Period (1 for 2007 and after) -0.0431*** 
(0.0113) 
Post-Period (1 for 2008 and after) 30.700  
(25.445) 
Treat*Post-Period -0.0058 
(0.0142) 
Treat*Post-Period -27.972  
(22.842) 
No. Observations 20,555 No. Observations 20,555 
R Square 0.0834 R Square 0.0729 
Panel E: Rural Vs Urban and Public Health 
Insurance OOPECTP 
 Panel F: Rural Vs Urban and Public 
Health Insurance OOPEs
 
Treat (1 for Rural Area and Public Health, 0 
for Urban Area and Public Health Insurance) 
0.0088*** 
(0.0101) 
Treat (1 for Rural Area and Public Health, 
0 for Urban Area and Public Health 
Insurance) 
10.046*** 
(2.101) 
Post-Period (1 for 2008 and after) -0.0460*** 
(0.0028) 
Post-Period (1 for 2008 and after) 4.596** 
(2.291) 
Treat*Post-Period -0.0040*** 
(0.0014) 
Treat*Post-Period -6.905** 
(3.426) 
No. Observations 37,160 No. Observations 37,160 
R Square 0.1052 R Square 0.0997  
Panel E: Rural Vs Urban and Public Health 
Insurance OOPECTP Placebo test 2007 
 Panel F: Rural Vs Urban and Public 
Health Insurance OOPEs Placebo test 
2007
 
Treat (1 for Rural Area and Public Health, 0 
for Urban Area and Public Health Insurance) 
0.0105*** 
(0.0090) 
Treat (1 for Rural Area and Public Health, 
0 for Urban Area and Public Health 
Insurance) 
6.400*** 
(2.044) 
Post-Period (1 for 2008 and after) -0.0471*** 
(0.0029) 
Post-Period (1 for 2008 and after) 2.215* 
(1.144) 
Treat*Post-Period -0.0012 (0.0014) Treat*Post-Period 1.558 
(3.312) 
No. Observations 37,160 No. Observations 37,160 
R Square 0.1054 R Square 0.0988  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	
	
	
	
Table 9: DID for OOPECTP and OOPEs Using Logarithms 
 Coefficients  Coefficients 
Panel A: Green Card Vs Public Health and 
OOPECTP 
 Panel B: Green Card Vs Public Health 
and OOPEs 
 
Treat (1 for Green Card, 0 for Public Health 
Insurance) 
0.0446 
(0.106) 
Treat (1 for Green Card, 0 for Public1) 
Health Insurance 
0.1670 (0.212) 
Post-Period (1 for 2008 and after) -0.1082*** 
(0.0310) 
Post-Period (1 for 2008 and after) 0.7074*  
(0.378) 
Treat*Post-Period  0.2129** 
(0.0982) 
Treat*Post-Period -0.260**  
(0.130) 
No. Observations 19,798 No. Observations 19,798 
R Square 0.1266 R Square 0.8773 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	
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Table 10: DID and Conditional Logit Estimates for Catastrophic Health Expenditures 
and Green Card 
 CataEx 10% CataEx 20% CataEx 30% CataEx 40% 
Treat (1 for Green Card, 0 for Public Health 
Insurance) 
0.0729 
(0.0454) 
0.0222 
(0.0298) 
0.0380* 
(0.0200) 
0.0180* 
(0.0105) 
Post-Period (1 for 2008 and after) -0.3307*** 
(0.0818) 
-0.0867* 
(0.0456) 
-0.0812** 
(0.0182) 
-0.0485** 
(0.0225) 
Treat*Post-Period -0.2227*** 
(0.0796) 
-0.0961** 
(0.0433) 
-0.0876** 
(0.0350) 
-0.0599*** 
(0.0220) 
No. Observations 20,092 14,983 11,887 7,396 
LR Square 432.29 
[0.000] 
248.49 
[0.000] 
128.82 
[0.000] 
104.45 
[0.000] 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, p-values within brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	
	
	
	
	
 
